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I. Introduction
Recent media attention surrounding executive pay has not only increased scrutiny of forprofit organizations, but the nonprofit sector as well (NY State Attorney General 2007; Boroff 2008; Banjo 2009; Wilhelm 2009; Gershman 2011) .
1 Concerns have been intensified by current economic conditions, including shrinking endowments and the overall economic downturn. In times of strained charity and personal budgets, donors are especially cautious of supporting nonprofit organizations with high CEO pay (Charity Navigator 2010 CEO Compensation Study).
Donors have expressed this exact concern on CharityNavigator.org, America's largest charity evaluator, indicating that high salaries have made them "reconsider their donations" to certain nonprofit organizations (Emerson 2010) . The IRS has raised similar concerns in a recent report of hospital executive compensation (IRS 2009 ). This comes in addition to several 2008 changes to IRS Form 990 requiring detailed disclosure of executive compensation in an effort to increase transparency and accountability. We examine whether donors have indeed "reconsidered their donations" by reducing contributions to nonprofits who pay their CEOs well.
Using a sample drawn initially from Charity Navigator and augmented by hand collected data from Form 990's we find that donors react to high CEO pay. Specifically, we find a negative relationship between direct donor contributions and CEO pay, a relationship that is robust over time and across industries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the motivation and hypothesis. This is followed by section III which discusses sample selection, 1 section IV the model specification, and section V which discusses our empirical results. Tests of robustness and paper conclusions are presented in sections VI and VII, respectively.
II. Motivation and hypothesis
There are about 1.4 million nonprofit organizations in the U.S. generating contributions of over $260 billion (Nonprofit Almanac 2007) . Given the magnitude of the contributions involved, the ability to attract and maintain supporters is vital to the survival of these organizations. Studies in the nonprofit sector find that donations are associated with three primary accounting measures: efficiency, effectiveness, and the ability to continue operations into the future (Parsons 2007). However, a fourth factor not examined in the literature (to the best of our knowledge) is the impact of executive compensation on contributors' willingness to support nonprofit organizations.
Anecdotally we know that supporters of the United Way withheld contributions in the wake of multiple scandals related to CEO compensation over the years. In 1992 uproar resulted from the disclosure of United Way President William Aramony receiving an annual compensation package worth $463,000. Even though Aramony resigned from his position shortly after this disclosure, it was estimated that United Way collections would be down 10 percent in 1992 from the year earlier, with the implication that some, if not the entire drop was caused by the scandal (Stodghill et al. 1992) . In sum, "faithful donors to the organization demanded change and greater accountability for the use of their charitable dollars" (Frumkin 2001) , evidence that nonprofits do respond to pressure from stakeholders to control executive pay.
Nonprofits compete with other organizations for employee and executive talent. While they may attract individuals who are less driven by extrinsic rewards 2 , in most cases they need to provide a pay package that is competitive with an individuals' other alternatives. Consequently, to attract and retain an individual capable of running a multi-million or billion dollar enterprise, nonprofits need to provide a compensation package that is competitive with that of for-profit entities. Emerson (2010) Emerson (2010) , "assume that charity leaders work for free or minimal pay and are shocked to see that they earn six figure salaries."
The IRS stipulates that nonprofit organizations pay executive compensation that is "fair and reasonable". While there is no collective standard for what is fair and reasonable, balancing the market value of executive talent and public trust is a critical component of charity success.
We argue that nonprofits perceived to pay their CEO excessively will suffer the political costs of reduced donor support. 3 Our research question is whether donors respond to high CEO pay by cutting back on donations to these organizations.
H1: Nonprofit organizations with higher CEO pay have lower direct donations.

III. Sample selection
To test our hypothesis we analyze a sample of over 7,000 firm year observations across six years and a broad array of industries. Navigator database are included in the NCCS SOI file. We are forced to delete 11,964 4 We utilize CEO salary information through 2007 given that our model requires lagged CEO compensation and the most recent data available for our dependent variable is for fiscal years ending 2008. 5 To verify that Charity Navigator salary data was extracted from the same source as our hand collected data, we selected a random sample of 10 salary observations provided by Charity Navigator and traced them to the organization's Form 990. In all 10 cases the information presented on the organization's Form 990 matched the salary information supplied by Charity Navigator. 6 To minimize our data collection efforts we only collected salary data for nonprofits for which we had all other data required for our empirical model. Consequently while it appears we have much less data for 2002 through 2004, the number of usable observations is not significantly smaller in those years.
observations for which financial information is not available. This leaves a final sample of 7,040
observations. See Table 1 for a reconciliation of our sample.
IV. Model specification
Dependent variable
While nonprofits fund their operations from a variety of sources including government grants and program service revenues, we focus on direct donations or public support. Direct public support has been defined by the IRS as the "amounts of contributions, gifts, grants, and bequests that the organization received directly from the public". We focus on direct public support as we believe that this source of funding, rather than government grants or program service revenues, would be most sensitive to the political costs associated with high compensation. Specifically, we test the response of direct donations to nonprofit CEO compensation; given that direct donations are the most straight forward measure of donor dissatisfaction.
Test variables
One of the issues we face is determining the appropriate form of the test variable. That is, for example, do donors and potential donors react to the level of CEO compensation or do they adjust for the scale of the nonprofit? Or do they react to some excess compensation threshold? Unfortunately there is no prior literature to provide guidance. Our main analysis is based on CEO salary as a percentage of total firm expenditures. We believe this may be the best functional form for two reasons. First, information sites such as Charity Navigator present this ratio to donors as a means of allowing for comparison between organizations. Second, because scaling by total expenses controls for the size of the organization, and it is well know that size is a major determinant of CEO compensation (Tosi et al. 2000) . This is important in a sector, and sample, where organizational size is so varied. However, because we are unsure of what donors react to, we also present results for several alternative test variables. In particular we also define CEO pay as: the level of CEO compensation, the change in CEO compensation, the percentage change in CEO compensation, 7 in addition to indicator variables taking the value of one if the ratio of CEO pay to total expenses is in the top 10, 20, or 25 percent of our sample, and zero otherwise. Whichever variable we use, we measure it as of year t-1 to allow for donors to become aware of CEO pay and adjust their donations accordingly. 8 Our expectation is that the test variable, however it is operationalized, will be negatively associated with the dependent variable, direct donations.
Control variables
Prior research (Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986; Posnett and Sandler 1989; Hyndman 1991; Callen 1994; Tinkelman 1998; Khumawala and Gordon 1997; Greenlee and Brown 1999; Parsons 2003; Tinkelman and Mankaney 2007; Parsons and Trussel 2008; Tinkelman 2009) confirms that organizational efficiency is associated with the ability to attract donations.
Following Baber et al. (2001) , we utilize the ratio of program service expenses to total expenses, or Program Ratio, to measure organizational efficiency. To illustrate consider a charity with $1,000 in program service expenses and total expenses of $2,000. The Program Ratio equals .5
for this organization which is interpreted as for every $1.00 donated, $0.50 is used to provide services related to the charity's mission. Our expectation, based on prior research, is that a more efficient organization will be better able to attract donations; hence we expect a positive coefficient on this variable.
The ability to continue operations has been described as the financial stability of a nonprofit organization. Chang and Tuckman (1991) define a ratio similar to the for-profit gross margin ratio, dubbed the operating margin, operationalized as the ratio of total revenues less total expenses divided by total revenues. Operating margin is found to be positively related to contributions (Chang and Tuckman 1991) and consequently we expect a positive coefficient.
Information quantity represents the amount of financial information displayed to potential contributors typically in the form of advertising or other means of making the mission of a nonprofit organization public. We use the fundraising expenses of an organization to proxy for the amount of information made available to contributors. Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) and Tinkelman (1999) find fundraising expenses to be positively related to donations received by an organization, thus we expect a positive coefficient on this variable.
Information quality is considered paramount in the decision to invest, as well as in the choice to contribute to a nonprofit firm. Parsons and Trussel (2008) identify two variables which are found to be related to the decision to donate: age and size. Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) suggest that a nonprofit's reputation, proxied by age, plays a role in the volume of contributions secured by an organization. Weisbrod and Dominguez operationalize reputation as the number of years since the initial 501(c)3 filing for tax exempt status and predict that increased organization age represents superior effectiveness. Organization size has been controlled for in related studies (Tinkelman 1998; Krishnan and Schauer 2000) and will be proxied for by year-end total assets.
We expect both organization age and total assets to be positively associated with the level of donations. Where all variables are defined above. CEOs paid in the top 10 (column 1), 20 (column 2), and 25 (column 3) percent of our sample. In all three columns we see the coefficient on the variable for high compensation is inversely 9 We lose a substantial number of firm year observations in our percentage change in CEO salary model because of zero value variables which inhibit the ability to calculate a percentage change ration.
V. Empirical results
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related to direct donations, once again supporting our hypothesis that donors restrict contributions to organizations that pay their CEOs more.
VI. Robustness Tests
We explore two additional avenues as a means of testing the robustness of our results. In the first we examine whether our findings are consistent across our sample period, while in the second we examine whether our findings are consistent across our sample industries.
To rule out the possibility that any one year is driving our results, we analyze our model by year. Table 7 presents the results of yearly regressions as well as the Fama MacBeth summary statistics. Consistent with our hypothesis and our earlier results, we observe an inverse relation between direct donations and the ratio of CEO salary to total expense in each year (2003 -2008) . The last column of Table 7 presents the Fama-MacBeth (1973) test which also confirms the robustness of our findings.
To rule out the possibility that any one industry is driving our results, we analyze our results by industry. Table 8 presents the results of industry regressions as well as the Fama MacBeth (1973) summary statistics. In all seven industries we observe an inverse relation between direct donations and the ratio of CEO salary to total expense.
VII. Conclusions
This paper examined the impact of nonprofit CEO compensation finding evidence which suggests that donors take CEO compensation into account when they decide whether and how much to contribute to a particular charity. This research extends and is incremental to prior work showing that donors consider a charity's success, efficiency, and stability in their donation decision. It also builds on for-profit research that documents the political costs associated with high CEO pay.
Using a fairly large sample of nonprofit organizations across a number of years and industries, we find that donors do react to high CEO pay. Specifically, we find a robust negative relationship between direct donor contributions and a variety of proxies for high or excessive CEO compensation. These empirical results support the notion that donors have "reconsidered their donations" and reduced their contributions to nonprofits that pay their CEO well. 
